Abstract: Jensen's "Eclipse of the public corporation" (1989) predicts that LBO transactions solve the agency problems of publicly listed companies with high levels of undistributed free cash flows (FCFs) and low growth opportunities. So far, empirical evidence in this context is mixed. This study is the first that provides evidence on the application of Jensen's FCF hypothesis (1986) to Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) in the European market. My univariate and multivariate findings indicate that Continental European companies with high Cash Flows before distribution and few investment opportunities whose P/E ratio is significantly lower than that of their industry peer group are more likely to be an LBO target. I do not find any evidence that European LBO targets suffer from agency problems prior to the transaction. JEL classification: G 34
Introduction
Identifying companies that are likely targets for leveraged going private transaction (LBO) is a potentially profitable activity for every investor in the stock market. Commonly, in those transactions, shareholders receive premiums within the scope of 35% to 56% of the current share price in the US market. 1 In the European market, premiums range from 36% to 41% 2 This empirical fact leads to the question why Private Equity companies pay a significantly higher price than the current market value for LBO targets. The answer can be found in the characteristics of LBO targets that seem to be different from those of firms remaining public.
In common LBO transactions all public shares outstanding are bought via tender offer by a so-called Private Equity investor. Subsequently, those shares are de-listed from the stock exchange. The main motive of the Private Equity Investor in the acquisition process is not to achieve operating synergies. This would be the main reason in takeovers where a strategic investor (e.g. an industry competitor) instead of a Private Equity Investor is involved (e.g. to increase market share etc.). Private Equity firms only try to detect inefficiencies in the target firm in order to increase its value. The crucial distinction to un-leveraged going private transactions is the use of an extensive amount of debt in LBOs. 3 Jensen's free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis (1986) is one possible explanation for the increase in value of a listed company via an LBO. It has always been in the focus of former empirical investigation into the rationale of LBOs. Many papers (i.a. Lehn and Poulsen 1989 , Opler and Titman 1993 and Huffman 1995 show results consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis whereas findings by Servaes (1994) , Kieschnick (1998) and Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) contradict Jensen's hypothesis.
If the FCF hypothesis is correct, LBO-targets should be characterized by certain features that make them special. This is the first European study, that identifies the firm characteristics increasing the odds of an LBO. 4 In doing so, I test the FCF hypothesis in the European market with the help of a logit regression model. Cash Flows before distribution and few investment opportunities whose P/E ratio is significantly lower than that of their industry peer group are more likely to be an LBO target.
I do not find any evidence that European LBO targets suffer from agency problems prior to the transaction.
So far, empirical studies investigating the FCF hypothesis on LBOs have come to different inferences due to the application of different econometric methodologies. 5 A logit probability model which is used to identify the characteristics of possible LBO candidates, can generally be estimated in two different ways:
In the first approach, the final sample contains nearly the total quantity of listed companies on a market which is separated into a relatively small LBO sample and a relatively 4 Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) investigate 95 going private transactions in the UK. Going private transactions do not have necessarily the features of LBOs (inter alia Jensen (1986) explains in his article the important role of debt in motivating organizational efficiency). 5 E.g. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Kieschnick (1998) Exchange. They employ a random sample including 5418 control group firms in the estimation of their acquisition model. Palepu (1985) has already criticized the "information content of such a sample … leading to relatively imprecise parameter estimates".
The other approach would be the use of a "non-random, equal-share" (Palepu 1985) sample. This approach can lead to incorrect estimates of the model parameters if the necessary modifications to the estimators of the logit regression model are neglected. 6 E.g. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) "apply random sample maximum likelihood estimators to a choice based sample 7 which leads to statistical problems" (Kieschnick 1998 ) for which they do not account.
This study uses a non-random, equal share sample and it employs the methodology by Manski and Mc Fadden (1981) that is appropriate for the issue at hand. They use a conditional maximum likelihood estimator in order to account for the impact of the choice based sampling method on the estimates of the parameters.
A separate analysis focusing on the European market is needed because, unlike the homogenous US capital market, the European market is heterogeneous in terms of capital market culture and development, legal framework and corporate governance standards. The most important difference lies in the composition of the shareholder structure. Most publicly traded companies in the US and the UK tend to be widely held whereas the ownership structure of most Continental European companies exhibits a large, dominant shareholder (e.g. families or institutional shareholders) who exert considerable control (Grant and Kirchmaier 2004) . 6 For a detailed description of this approach see: Palepu (1985) . 7 Kieschnick (1998) defines a non-random sample as choice based sample.
Additionally, the market for corporate control is less active and less developed in Continental Europe (Franks and Mayer 1990) In the following section the sample selection process is described. In the subsequent section the variables measuring the firm characteristics are explained and univariate results are presented. Thereafter, the logit regression methodology is described and the results of the multivariate regression models are outlined. The final section summarizes the results and concludes.
Sampling Process And Data
This paper analyses the differences between companies that undergo an LBO and companies that remain public. In the following I describe the creation of the two different samples, starting with the LBO sample:
By researching the Reuters, Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal Database a total of 176
European going private's that took place from 1996 to 2002 are identified.
Filtering the transactions by the following five criteria leads to the final LBO-sample:
(1) The LBO had to take place in one of the EU member states.
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(2) The deal had to be at least 50% debt financed.
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(3) A significant majority of the target company's common stock is bought via tender offer.
(4) Complete shareholding data at least one year before the buyout had to be accessible.
(5) The buyout had to be led by a Private Equity Investor as opposed to wealthy individuals or strategic investors.
As the cross-sectional analysis requires some variables to be industry-adjusted, peer groups of five publicly listed competitors for each of the 76 companies were identified. The selection of the peer groups is based on the automatic Bloomberg peer group selection -out of this selection, those five companies that were most comparable to the LBO company with respect 8 Based on the composition of the EU in Dec. 2002. 9 Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) also use this criterion in order to identify pure LBO transactions. Here, debt financing includes all cash interest bearing debt or debt-like tranches, such as Senior Debt, Mezzanine Notes and Bridge Loans. They did not include debt-like tranches sponsored by the Private Equity investor, such as shareholder loans or PIK notes.
to their operations and regional focus and in terms of size were included in the peer group.
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For three companies an appropriate peer group could not be identified.
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Finally, I obtained a sample of 73 LBO transactions. There is a clear dominance of UK companies in the sample as of 73 companies 49 are from the UK (see table I ).
Insert Table I here
Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) I construct a matched sample of 73 LBO targets and 73 firms that remained public. Manski and McFadden (1981) show that in a population where the number of LBOs is very small relative to the number of non-LBOs the information content of a choice-based sample is higher than that of a random sample. The matching criteria are firm size and industry. It is necessary to control for industry effects because over-sampling and accordingly over-representation of one industrial group could lead to biased outcomes (Song and Walking 1993) . Industry was measured by the Bloomberg industrial classification and size by market capitalization.
In order to account for the sampling procedure used where the number of LBOs is overstated and the number of companies remaining public is understated I employ choice based maximum likelihood estimators in my regression analysis.
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Financial data and company data employed throughout the analysis come from
Datastream and Bloomberg.
Insert Table II here Table II shows various descriptive statistics of the LBO sample. The relationship between the average and the median transaction value in Table II indicates that there are a few large transactions and a lot of smaller ones over the sample period. The majority of transaction volumes (more than 68%) lies below EUR 400m .
Univariate Analysis of LBO characteristics
Table III provides summary statistics and significance tests for univariate differences in firm characteristics between firms undergoing an LBO and firms remaining public.
Insert Table III here
According to Jensen (1986) to the shareholders, debt-holders and the public authority. It is a reasonable proxy for the degree of the agency problem within the company:
On the other hand I employ a measure of FCF before distribution FCF (BD) because
Private Equity Investors look for companies that have a high level of distributed cash flows and whose market value does not reflect this fact:
In order to measure the underperformance of those companies on the stock market I employ two different measures:
First, the company's P/E-ratio compared to its industry peer group shows the valuation of the company's operations compared to its competitors. The P/E-ratios employed in this study are based on a mean of ten trading days, measured two months prior to the LBO announcement.
Second, the devaluation of the firm's stock over time before the LBO transaction is another way to measure underperformance. The numerator of the variable PRICE is defined 13 See Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) .
as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior to the LBO transaction divided by the average price, measured over 500 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the LBO transaction. In order to exclude market movements I divide this figure by the equivalent ratio of the respective country MSCI market index. Despite these unfavorable growth opportunities the FCF hypothesis predicts that likely LBO targets invest in negative net present value projects because managers want to increase their private benefits through empire building. Therefore, PE-Investors take a closer look at companies that "overinvest" with regard to their industry peers. In those companies, a more efficient structuring of the capital expenditures (CAPEX) will lead to a higher firm value. To capture inefficient investments I compare the companies' CAPEX to its industry peers' CAPEX.
Results in Table III do not support the notion that likely LBO targets invest more than their industry counterparts remaining public. This strengthens empirical evidence by Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) .
As a robustness check for the variables testing agency problems -namely undistributed FCF and CAPEX -I also investigate the shareholder structure in likely LBO firms and firms remaining public. In companies with scattered shareholdings the free rider problem prevents investors -especially those with small holdings -from sacrificing their resources to monitor the management (Amihud 1989 and Murphy 1990) . This "free-riding"-behaviour of the individual small shareholders leads to a situation where the company's shares are traded at a discount on the stock exchange. Following this argument, potential acquirers should try to identify those companies in order to reap the gains after the elimination of those agency costs.
Therefore, I expect that companies with a higher free float are more likely to undergo an LBO transaction than companies with large blockholders.
But Grossmann and Hart's (1980) free riding argument in takeover situations may predict differently. They found that shareholders in an atomistic shareholder structure do not want to tender their shares to the bidder whenever they assume that the intrinsic value of the firm is higher than the offer price. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that small shareholders are not pivotal in the success of the takeover and therefore, they prefer to wait until the new acquirer has increased the value of the firm. Following this argument, the probability of conducting an LBO transaction should be lower for companies with an atomistic shareholder structure.
The free float is being determined by subtracting all shareholdings of investors with a share of more than 5% 15 of the share capital from the total share capital. These shareholdings are based on the last annual financial statement published prior to the LBO announcement. In contrast to common stock exchange free float-definitions, 16 shareholdings of mutual funds are considered not to be free float as soon as they are in excess of 5%. It can be argued that these sizeable shareholdings give the fund a certain degree of influence. In addition, such funds will probably pay more attention to management's actions than funds with smaller shareholdings.
Even though it is unlikely that fund managers with large shareholdings will actively interfere, they will surely have and use the opportunity to directly approach management to express their views.
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As can be seen in table XV, the firm's free float level does not explain the buyout activity of PE-investors. This leads us to the conclusion that either non or both of the above mentioned effects have a significant influence on the probability to go private. 15 Although shareholdings below 5% have to be declared in the UK, I applied the 5% threshold European wide in order to get consistent results (e.g. the German regulation defines the threshold as 5% and therefore it is not possible to get information about shareholdings below 5% The univariate analysis has the disadvantage that it cannot capture the interactions between the explanatory variables. Therefore, I now turn to a multivariate regression analysis.
Multivariate Analysis of LBO characteristics Empirical Model
The dependent variable under scrutiny is a binary variable indicating whether a company was taken private via LBO in the time period from 1997 to 2002 (1=LBO, 0=staying public). Palepu (1985) shows that under certain circumstances 19 the functional relationship between the likelihood of a company undergoing an LBO and its characteristics can be represented by the following probability model:
The explanatory variables follow the Type I extreme value distribution which implies that P(i,t) is a logit probability function. The intuition behind this model can be explained as follows:
20 18 For a detailed discussion of the logit model see: e.g. Greene (2003) . 19 Inter alia these assumptions are that there is a large amount of bidders for the target company and that the shareholders of the target accept the best offer for their shares. 20 For details see: Palepu (1985) .
The probability of an LBO transaction depends on the number of offers potential acquirers make for this target company. This again depends on the specific characteristics of the company which are measured by the matrix x(i,t). The probability distribution of these random variables determine the specific functional form of the acquisition model.
In the context of this analysis -employing a choice based sample -I conduct a conditional maximum likelihood estimation 21 in order to account for the sample selection and to avoid biases in the estimators of the intercept and the variance estimates.
Multivariate Results

I estimate three different empirical models. The first model includes all variables that
have a potential influence on the probability of a going private transaction. Besides the variables included in the univariate analysis I add four interaction terms in order to capture the influence of the different Corporate Governance Standards in the UK and Continental Europe.
The four additional interaction terms included are FCF (AD), FCF (BD), CAPEX and Free
Float multiplied each with a dummy that is one for Continental Europe and 0 for the UK.
The second model is a restricted model which only includes those variables that are significant in model one. In model three I exclude two variables of the first model in order to avoid multicollinearity problems between the independent variables. 22 Table IV Manski and McFadden (1981) . 22 I excluded all variables whose correlation coefficient with another variable is larger than 50%. These variables are: FCF (AD) and Size (high pairwise correlation with FCF (BD) and Tobin's Q, respectively). 23 There is no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals of all three regressions as the likelihood ratio statistics for testing the homoscedasticity assumption in all three models are below their 95% critical values.
Insert Table IV here
The likelihood ratio statistics for models I and III are significant at the 5% level and for model II at the 1% level. These statistics are used to test the overall significance of the models
The McFadden R-squared ratio is an analog to the R 2 reported in linear regressions and hence measures the explanatory power of the models. Throughout the models the explanatory power is quite high as the ratios are 25.9%, 14.2% and 24.4%, respectively. Similar studies like Huffman (1995) (R 2 s ranging from 3.73% to 6.23%) and Palepu (1985) (R 2 s ranging from 6.95% to 12.45%) show significantly lower R 2 s than this study.
In model I, there are three variables that affect the probability of companies going private.
Firstly, there is the FCF (BD) variable for Continental European companies which captures the operating performance of the target company and is significant at the 5% level. In addition, the variables P/E and the Tobin's q are significant at the 10% level. 
Conclusion
In this study the application of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis (1986) to European LBO transactions is examined. Results from univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the predictions derived from the FCF hypothesis are not supported in all its details. Neither the level of FCF after distribution (a variable used in recent studies for the US, e.g. Lehn and Poulsen 1989 and Opler Titman 1993) -nor other variables testing the mitigation of agency problems through an LBO significantly influence the probability of European companies going private.
Still, I find distinguishing features of LBO targets and companies remaining public that confirm former empirical results by Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) for the US market and Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) for the UK market.
The univariate results indicate that LBO firms tend to have lower growth opportunities and poorer performance than their industry counterparts prior to the LBO announcement and have significantly higher FCFs before distribution to debt-and equity holders and the government. These results are consistent with Jensen's theory since these features characterize companies in cash-rich industries with stable operating earnings and few investment opportunities whose market value does not reflect the intrinsic value of the firm.
The multivariate results confirm the univariate findings for Continental European firms and, to a lesser degree, for all European companies.
The implications of these results are that corporate governance does not seem to matter with regard to the probability of a company being taken private. The past operating performance, the prospects of the future operating performance and the firm's stock price are the driving forces influencing the odds of a company becoming an LBO target.
Future investors in European equity markets should take these considerations into account when making their investment decisions because shareholders of companies going private in European markets earn abnormal returns in the range from 28% to 29%.
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Therefore, further research into this topic should try to examine the possibility of identifying the ex-ante probability of future LBO transactions in order to derive a profitable investment strategy. Table III Results of the Univariate Analysis The following table compares the LBO companies with the companies remaining public. The data is taken from the last published balance sheet before the buyout announcement (apart from the P/E and the PRICE variables). The FCF (AD) variable measures the earnings before depreciation and amortization but after tax, interest payments and dividends standardized with total sales. The FCF (BD) represents the EBITDA divided by total sales. The relative P/E-ratio is computed by dividing the company's P/E-ratio by the P/E-ratio of the industry peer-group. The numerator of the variable price is defined as the ratio of the closing market price two months prior to the LBO transaction divided by the average price, measured over 500 trading days counting backwards from two months prior to the LBO transaction. In order to exclude market movements I divide this figure by the equivalent ratio of the respective country MSCI market index. Tobin's q is the ratio of the firm's market value of assets divided by its book value. The variable CAPEX is computed by dividing the average capital expenditures of the company over a 3 year horizon by the average capital expenditures of its industry competitors over the same time period. The free float is being determined by subtracting all shareholdings of investors with a share of more than 5% of the share capital from the firm's total share capital. The Size variable is simply the market value of equity.
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